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Animal minds in time: the question of episodic memory 
Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack 
 
In his book Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson writes: 
 
When a dog welcomes his master, barking and wagging his tail, he certainly 
recognizes him; but does this recognition imply the evocation of a past 
image…? [The] past does not interest the animal enough to detach it from the 
fascinating present […]. To call up the past in the form of an image, we must 
be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have 
the power to value the useless, we must have the will to dream. Man alone is 
capable of such an effort. (Bergson 1911: 93f.) 
 
Bergson’s words evoke a trope that can be found in the works of philosophers as 
diverse as Aristotle (1930, 453a4-13), Friedrich Nietzsche (1983, p. 60f.), and Daniel 
Dennett (2005, p. 168f.). The idea is that there is a deep discontinuity between us and 
the rest of the animal kingdom when it comes to the role of time in our mental lives: 
non-human animals are, in some sense, cognitively stuck in the present. This idea has 
recently received fresh attention, and is now typically framed in terms of the question 
as to whether animals are capable of having episodic memories (Tulving 2001). The 
thought, in short, is that the human capacity to consciously recollect particular past 
events constitutes an important way in which we can cognitively transcend the 
present. As it is sometimes put, it constitutes a form of ‘mental time travel’. And the 
question is whether non-human animals, too, are capable of mentally transporting 
themselves to another time in this way. 
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1. A background issue: the question of function 
Bergson’s remark about “the power to value the useless” was perhaps not meant 
entirely literally. It can more plausibly be seen as a rhetorical device aimed at drawing 
attention to a key issue in the background of the question as to whether animals have 
episodic memories – the question of the function of episodic memory. Much human 
reminiscing about times gone by seems to serve no useful practical purpose. And even 
when episodic memories contain useful information about events or situations of a 
type we may encounter again, this information could arguably equally well be carried 
by other forms of memory, in which only generic knowledge is retained. So there is a 
genuine question as to whether there is ever any specific point to being able to cast 
one’s mind back to a particular past event as such, given that that particular event 
will never come round again.  
If there is no easily identifiable distinct adaptive function that episodic 
memory can be seen to serve, this obviously also makes it difficult to come up with 
experimental paradigms that hold the potential to yield unambiguous evidence of the 
presence of episodic memories in animals. It is therefore a hopeful sign that the 
question of the function of episodic memory has recently moved into the forefront of 
attention in the context of research on ‘mental time travel’ more generally conceived, 
which views episodic memory as part of a larger functional system that also includes 
capacities for specific forms of future directed thinking (Boyer 2008; Hoerl & 
McCormack 2016; Klein 2016; Schacter et al. 2007). A clear consensus has yet to 
emerge from this literature as to how precisely the function of episodic memory is to 
be construed, but we will briefly mention one particular suggestion at the end of this 
chapter. 
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For the moment, one important thing to note is that what we are calling the 
question of function, as we understand it, is not answered by saying that episodic 
memory is memory for particular past events, or that it involves the retention of 
information, as it is sometimes put, about ‘what’ happened, ‘where’ and ‘when’. For 
that just raises the question of function again, i.e. the question as to what the benefit 
is, to the individual, of being able to retain such information. This point, we believe, 
sometimes gets lost in what has perhaps been the predominant strand of debate in the 
recent literature on animal episodic memory. As a result, even though there remains 
deep disagreement on the question as to whether animals can be credited with 
episodic memory, there is in fact something of an unhealthy consensus regarding the 
way the terms of the debate are framed. As we discuss in more detail below, it is 
typically assumed on all sides that certain animal experiments have successfully 
demonstrated that animals can retain information about ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when’, 
and debates have mainly focussed on whether this is sufficient to also demonstrate 
that they possess episodic memory. We want to make a case for shifting the focus of 
the debate elsewhere. 
 
2. Is “the only thing missing” evidence of conscious phenomenology of 
recollection? 
It is a series of studies on scrub-jays carried out by Nicola Clayton and her colleagues 
that is largely responsible for the recent surge of interest in the question as to whether 
animals have episodic memories (Clayton & Dickinson 1998; de Kort et al. 2005; 
Griffiths et al. 1999). Western scrub-jays are food-caching birds who have a strong 
preference for eating worms over eating nuts. But worms are perishable, whereas nuts 
are relatively nondegradable. Clayton and her colleagues exploited these facts in 
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creating a set-up in which a group of scrub-jays could learn that worms were still 
fresh 4 hours after caching, whereas they had decayed and become inedible after 124 
hours. The jays were given opportunities on different occasions to cache either one or 
the other food source, and later to retrieve their caches. What the researchers found 
was that the birds were sensitive, at recovery, to how long ago they had cached the 
worms. If they had cached the nuts some time ago, and the worms just four hours ago, 
they tried to retrieve the worms. If they had cached the worms 124 hours ago, they 
tried to retrieve the nuts, leaving the caching site of the worms undisturbed.  
In interpreting these findings, Clayton et al. (2003, p. 686) draw a contrast 
between, as they call it, “phenomenological and behavioral criteria for episodic 
memory”, respectively, pointing out that much of the literature characterizing 
episodic memory in humans focuses on its distinct phenomenology as a conscious 
phenomenon. What they claim is that their study demonstrates that the jays can 
remember ‘what’ they cached, ‘where’, and ‘when’, thus providing behavioral 
evidence for memory that is, they say, at least ‘episodic-like’ in these respects, even 
though the study leaves open whether the jays also have the same phenomenology of 
mentally re-experiencing the past that humans enjoy when they recollect events in 
episodic memory. 
Interestingly, this general analysis of Clayton and Dickinson’s study is in fact 
shared by many of those authors who are skeptical about the existence of episodic 
memory in animals. In the view of the latter, the conscious experience of mentally re-
experiencing the past is essential to episodic memory, and because it is not clear 
whether the jays have this experience, we lack evidence that they have episodic 
memory. Here for instance is Endel Tulving’s assessment of the significance of 
Clayton and Dickinson’s study: 
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The ingenious and convincing demonstrations of the ‘what, where, when’ 
memory in scrub jays by Clayton and her colleagues come very close to 
clinching the case for the jays’ episodic memory. The only thing missing is 
evidence that they have human-like conscious recollections of their worm and 
nut caching activities. (Tulving 2001: 1512)  
 
Similarly, Thomas Suddendorf and his colleagues, who have been amongst the most 
vigorous defenders of the claim that episodic memory is unique to humans 
(Suddendorf & Busby 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis 2007), seem in agreement with 
Clayton and her colleagues regarding the basic dialectical situation, which they 
describe as having to define episodic memory either “in terms of the information 
encoded” (Suddendorf & Busby 2003: 392), or in terms of the phenomenology of 
travelling back in time, where these are seen as mutually exclusive options, because 
one “can know what happened where and when without being able to remember the 
event (e.g. your birth) and, conversely, one can travel back in time without access to 
accurate when and where information” (ibid.).    
We believe that this is an unhelpful way of framing the dialectic of the debate 
over the question as to whether animals are capable of episodic recollection. Take, for 
instance, the stance taken by Clayton and her colleagues. Although they are not 
officially committing themselves either way, there are essentially two ways in which 
this stance might be fleshed out. Either it implies that it is indeed possible for animals 
to engage in much the same kinds of information processing as humans, but without 
the conscious phenomenology that accompanies it in humans. Or the view is that, 
because their study provides the best available evidence for animal episodic memory, 
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we should also accept that such memory is accompanied by the same phenomenology 
that accompanies human episodic recollection (Eichenbaum et al. 2005, explicitly 
take a position along those lines).  
Note that if either of these was in fact the target view at stake in the debate, it 
would actually render it mysterious why it is the question of animal episodic memory, 
specifically, that is supposed to be of special interest in that debate. The first view just 
described effectively relies on something like the philosophical ‘zombie hypothesis’ 
in the literature on physicalist approaches to consciousness, according to which it is 
possible for an organism to show exactly the same behavior as a conscious human 
being, but without enjoying any conscious phenomenology. Conversely, on the 
second view, it is those who question the existence of animal episodic memory who 
are effectively portrayed as relying on something like this hypothesis. But the zombie 
hypothesis is a completely general skeptical hypothesis, covering all forms of activity 
that typically involve conscious awareness in humans. So it is unclear what the 
dialectical benefit would be (to either side) in trying to invoke it to make a point 
specifically about episodic memory.  
We believe that the existing focus on a supposed dichotomy between 
information-based and consciousness-based approaches to episodic memory anyway 
misrepresents some of the arguments that are being made, including arguments by 
some of the researchers who subscribe to the idea of such a dichotomy. As we want to 
argue, what should really be at issue is whether it is even correct to describe Clayton 
and Dickinson’s study as demonstrating the existence of a form of memory in which 
information about ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when’ is retained.  
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3. Being sensitive to time without representing the past 
Somewhat contrary to their own claim that “[t]he current evidence suggests that scrub 
jays […] can encode, store and use information about what they cached where and 
when” (2003: 394), Suddendorf and Busby at one point also write that the cognitive 
processes governing the behavior exhibited in Clayton and her colleagues’ studies 
“need not be about the past at all” (ibid., p. 392). Following Dretske (1982), they 
explain: “[E]vent A might cause cognitive change B that affects behavior C at a later 
point in time, but this need not imply that B carries any information about A itself – 
the mediator B might be causal rather than informational. Thus, although jays perform 
actions C (recovery) that make sense only in the light of A (caching what, where and 
when) it need not imply that B represents the past event A” (ibid.). 
On the face of it, this would seem to be a way of arguing against the claim that 
Clayton and her colleagues have demonstrated episodic memory in animals that does 
not rely on considerations about phenomenology. Instead, it concerns what it means 
to say that an organism has information about or represents something. But how can 
we flesh out Suddendorf and Busby’s remark further, to see how exactly the rather 
abstract thought they sketch might apply to this particular case? The jays studied by 
Clayton et al. are clearly sensitive to the temporal interval that has elapsed since they 
cached the worms. So what grounds might there be for thinking that they nevertheless 
do not represent the worm-caching event as lying at the far end of that interval, in a 
way that would warrant describing them as remembering ‘when’ the caching 
happened? 
In general, we can distinguish between two quite different ways in which an 
individual’s cognitive state might be sensitive to the passing of time. One of them 
involves explicitly representing events as happening at an array of different times. By 
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contrast, in what we have elsewhere referred to as temporal updating (Hoerl 2008; 
Hoerl & McCormack 2011; McCormack & Hoerl 2005), the individual just operates 
with a model of its current environment, which is updated in ways that are sensitive 
to the passing of time, but with each update simply replacing its predecessor. In its 
simplest form, such updating would consist in changing the model in response to new 
perceptual information that conflicts with the previous model. But temporal updating 
could also, for instance, explain certain basic forms of sequential learning. Becoming 
sensitive to the sequence in which a familiar set of events typically unfolds might 
simply be a matter of acquiring a routine for serially updating one’s model of one’s 
current environment, so that representations of the relevant events come to succeed 
each other in the right order in successive instantiations of that model.  
So the general thought here would be that some forms of sensitivity to the 
passing of time can be explained by appealing to processes governing how the 
individual’s model of the environment gets updated over time, where this is to be 
contrasted with the idea that temporal relations are themselves represented in that 
model. Is there also an explanation of the scrub jays’ caching behavior available that 
relies only on the idea of temporal updating? Note that one thing that should be 
uncontroversial is that their behavior must, in part, be governed by a mechanism that 
can keep track of intervals of time. Unless we postulate the existence of some kind of 
internal interval timer that is causally responsive to the amount of time that has 
elapsed since the caching took place it remains mysterious how the jays can show 
differential behavior depending on the length of that interval. But, given that the 
behavior must be based on the use of such a timer, we can once again distinguish two 
different mechanisms by which its workings could influence behavior (see also 
McCormack 2001 and Hoerl 2008). One of these involves producing mental 
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representations in which the caching and the interval elapsed since figure – as implied 
by the idea of a memory for ‘what’, ‘where’ and ‘when’. Yet, in line with the idea of 
temporal updating, there is also another, simpler, mechanism by which such a timer 
could have an impact on behavior, viz. by determining how long aspects of the 
individual’s model of its environment will be maintained in existence. In other words, 
what the timer would determine is how long the presence of the worms (or worms-as-
food) in their caching location would continue to figure in the jays’ model of their 
current environment before disappearing from that model. It is in this sense that the 
processes governing the birds’ behavior “need not be about the past”, as Suddendorf 
and Busby put it. 
 
4. Event-independent thought about times 
If the considerations presented in the previous section are along the right lines, the 
crucial question they raise is how exactly human temporal cognition goes beyond 
mere temporal updating, and whether there is any evidence that can bear on the 
question as to whether animals, too, can engage in modes of temporal cognition that 
go beyond temporal updating.  
Elsewhere, we have argued that one distinctive feature of mature human 
temporal cognition is that it involves event-independent thought about times (Hoerl & 
McCormack 2011; McCormack & Hoerl 2008), i.e. the idea of time as a framework 
of positions at which different events can be located. Episodic memory can be seen as 
one manifestation of such event-independent thought about times, in so far as it 
involves the ability to retain information about events that are no longer part of one’s 
environment specifically by cognitively placing those events at other times. This 
arguably requires the ability to make those other times an object of thought in their 
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own right, rather than just retaining features of the events in question that might still 
be of relevance to how the world is now.   
Thus, at least one important aspect of the question as to whether non-human 
animals have episodic memories is whether they can engage in event-independent 
thinking about time, rather than just relying on temporal updating. Is there any 
existing research that might help in answering this question? We will conclude by 
briefly considering two such lines of research, which may also help to clarify what 
exactly the question consists in.  
One relevant line of research concerns the question as to whether animals can 
experience regret. As we have argued in more detail elsewhere, regret involves event-
independent thinking about past times, and indeed one key function of episodic 
memory may in fact lie in underpinning the ability to experience regret (Hoerl & 
McCormack 2016). Regret is sometimes referred to as a counterfactual emotion, as it 
turns crucially on a grasp of the idea that what one did at a certain point in the past 
was not the only option available at that time, and that one’s making a different 
choice might have led to a different, better, outcome. This also, arguably, means that 
regret involves the ability to think of the time when the past choice was made 
independently of thinking just of that choice and its outcome. 
 In order to investigate whether rats can experience regret, Steiner and Redish 
(2014) constructed a spatial decision-making task in which rats could sequentially 
visit four different food locations, each with a different kind of food. When entering 
each food location rats heard a tone that was gradually decreasing in pitch, with the 
pitch of the tone indicating the delay the rat had to wait until gaining access to the 
food at that location. The delays, lasting between 1 and 45 seconds, were selected 
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pseudorandomly, and if the rat left the location before the delay was over, the 
countdown stopped and the rat had to move on to another location for food.  
 After determining the rats’ food preferences, and the threshold duration each 
rat was prepared to wait for each foodstuff on each day, the researchers analysed in 
particular those sequences in which rats abandoned waiting for one type of food even 
though the delay, on that occasion, was below the threshold for that type, and the 
delay for the next type of food then turned out to be greater than the threshold for that 
type. As they explain, this kind of sequence can be interpreted as one “in which the 
rat skipped a low-cost offer, only to find itself faced with a high-cost offer” (Steiner 
& Redish 2014: 998). This was compared with sequences in which the rat took the 
first, low-cost, offer, and then encountered a high-cost one, and sequences in which 
both offers were high-cost, and the rat skipped the first one, only to find itself faced 
with another high-cost one. As Steiner and Redish argue, these latter two control 
conditions are ones that might prompt disappointment or frustration, but, unlike the 
first, are not potentially regret-inducing, because the rat acts correctly, given its 
preferences and the relevant thresholds. 
  Steiner and Redish found that the rats treated the potentially regret-inducing 
sequences differently from each of the two types of control sequence. Specificallly, in 
the former, they “paused and looked backwards towards the previous option” (ibid.), 
which they had abandoned. This was accompanied by neurophysiological activity that 
corresponded to the missed action. 
 Steiner and Redish’s interpretation is that the rats experienced regret at their 
past decision to leave the previous food location rather than waiting out the delay. 
This implies ascribing to them the capacity to turn their minds back to the past in 
quite a robust sense, i.e. to genuinely revisit a past time in their thinking, in so far as 
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they can think of it both as the time they made a certain choice, but also a time at 
which another choice, too, could have been made. This is an intriguing suggestion, 
particularly in the light of research that suggests that regret is a cognitively 
sophisticated emotion that is late-developing in children (O'Connor et al. 2012, 2014; 
Weisberg & Beck 2010). It is largely because of its counterfactual element that regret 
is viewed as cognitively sophisticated, and a key challenge facing a regret-based 
interpretation of animal behavior is to provide convincing evidence that the behavior 
in question is indeed underpinned by counterfactual thought.  
In typical human studies of regret (e.g., Camille et al. 2004; Mellers et al. 
1999) participants are faced with a choice (e.g., between a safe and a risky gamble in 
a trial of a gambling task), and at that choice point they do not know what outcome 
would result from the choice they could take but subsequently reject. Only once they 
have made their actual choice and have found out the outcome resulting from that 
choice are they provided with information about the outcome the rejected choice 
would have yielded, which on a regret trial turns out to be better than that of the 
actual choice. This makes it more difficult to explain the subsequently-reported 
negative emotion without appealing to participants entertaining a counterfactual about 
a past state of affairs (i.e., what would have happened if they had chosen differently), 
because participants’ motivational state, experience, intention, and decision, are, up 
until that point, potentially identical to those in a control trial in which exactly the 
same choice is made but the actual outcome is better than or equivalent to the 
outcome of the other choice (and also to those in a so-called “partial feedback” trial in 
which participants never find out the outcome associated with the non-chosen option). 
This is not the case in Steiner and Redish’s study, where the previous experience and 
presumably motivational state of the animal differs by definition across ‘regret’ and 
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control trials. This makes it somewhat harder to argue that the rats must be 
entertaining a counterfactual.1  
The example of regret serves to demonstrate that focusing on the significance 
of event-independent thought about time is useful in broadening the scope of the 
studies that can be considered to be relevant to assessing animals’ temporal abilities.  
We finish by describing a study that can be interpreted as examining another type of 
behavior requiring event-independent thought about time in a different species, i.e. 
great apes. Adapting a procedure first used by Beck et al. (2006) to test children, 
Redshaw and Suddendorf (2016) showed apes a forked tube apparatus with one 
opening at the top but two openings at the bottom and demonstrated that a grape 
dropped into the top opening could emerge from either bottom opening, it being 
apparently random from which it would emerge on each occasion. The apparatus was 
then moved closer to the apes, so that they had the opportunity to catch the grapes as 
they emerged from the bottom opening; otherwise, the grapes would roll out of reach. 
The experimenters found that none of a number of great apes they tested 
spontaneously covered both bottom openings on their first trial, and only one of them 
did so at all on the initial twelve test trials, but subsequently regressed to covering 
only one opening. 
 That apes fail this relatively simple task seems to point to a fairly basic 
limitation in the ability to think about the future. Specifically, what they seem to lack 
is the ability to apply the equivalent of the type of thinking about the past that we 
have argued is involved in regret. The grape dropped into the apparatus is clearly part 
                                                 
1 It may be possible to design rat experiments that more closely resemble the human tasks in this 
respect, given the emerging body of research on the effects of entirely fictive rewards on animal 
behavior (Hayden et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2015). 
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of their model of the world, even after it has disappeared in the top opening, but it 
appears that they cannot think of the time at which it will emerge as a time at which it 
will emerge from one of the bottom openings, but at which it could emerge from 
either one of them. Thus, Redshaw and Suddendorf’s study might be taken to be 
indicative of an inability to engage in event-independent thought about times, 
indicating instead that apes’ cognitive abilities with respect to time are limited to mere 
temporal updating. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Are animals cognitively stuck in the present, or are they, like us, able to mentally 
revisit particular past events in episodic memory? In this chapter, we have made a 
case for shifting the existing focus of debate on this issue from considerations about 
the phenomenology of episodic recollection to the question as to whether there is 
evidence that animals are capable of event-independent thinking about times, or 
whether they a capable of temporal updating only. In temporal updating, there may be 
a variety of mechanisms by which the passing of time can influence the model of its 
environment that an individual operates with. Yet, this does not mean that time itself 
– the past and the future alongside the present – figures in that model. Episodic 
memory, by contrast, involves retaining information about events specifically by 
cognitively placing them at a past time. This, we have suggested, requires making that 
past time an object of thought in its own right, as one that could also have been filled 
with different events. As such, episodic memory is distinct from other ways of 
retaining or being sensitive to information over time not just in virtue of its 
phenomenology, but also in the way in which it is bound up with quite sophisticated 
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abilities to think about the possible as well as the actual, which remain to be 
demonstrated in non-human animals. 
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